[Asterisk-Users] IAX2 authentication confusion (bug 1928)
Kevin P. Fleming
kpfleming at backtobasicsmgmt.com
Sat Jun 26 07:43:05 MST 2004
Rich Adamson wrote:
> Reading way between the lines and taking an educated guess, I'd suggest
> the reasoning behind Mark's architectual thoughts are likely to relate
> to providing peer-to-peer call completion capabilities, as opposed to
> forcing all * systems to pass through some service-provider's-voip-
> switch. If implemented correctly, you control how anonymous calls are
> handled/allowed via contexts, and not through simple password schemes.
> In all liklihood, the code is probably not totally implemented as yet
> to achieve the objective.
Mark's response to the bug entered explained the situation fairly well,
and I have updated the IAX2 wiki page with a note about this issue.
Basically, the simple solutions are:
- use only RSA keys for authentication (can't be guessed)
- use IP-based access control for any "type=user" entries in iax.conf
that would provide access to services that you don't want anonymous
users to be able to "steal"
- as a last resort, provide a "guest" user entry in iax.conf (no secret
specified), which goes to a limited context (possibly just
Congestion)... Asterisk will always choose this no-secret-specified user
entry first for any anonymous incoming IAX2 connections, without
proposing any kind of secret match/challenge with the caller
I don't see a problem with having all these options. One, or a
combination, should provide everything everyone needs.
I'm reviewing the current chan_iax2 code right now, and I'm going to
write a new wiki page for "IAX2 Authentication" to document all this
stuff more clearly so others don't have to figure it out the way I did :-)
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