[Asterisk-Users] IAX2 authentication confusion (bug 1928)

Kevin P. Fleming kpfleming at backtobasicsmgmt.com
Sat Jun 26 07:43:05 MST 2004


Rich Adamson wrote:

> Reading way between the lines and taking an educated guess, I'd suggest
> the reasoning behind Mark's architectual thoughts are likely to relate
> to providing peer-to-peer call completion capabilities, as opposed to
> forcing all * systems to pass through some service-provider's-voip-
> switch. If implemented correctly, you control how anonymous calls are
> handled/allowed via contexts, and not through simple password schemes.
> In all liklihood, the code is probably not totally implemented as yet
> to achieve the objective.

Mark's response to the bug entered explained the situation fairly well, 
and I have updated the IAX2 wiki page with a note about this issue.

Basically, the simple solutions are:

- use only RSA keys for authentication (can't be guessed)
- use IP-based access control for any "type=user" entries in iax.conf 
that would provide access to services that you don't want anonymous 
users to be able to "steal"
- as a last resort, provide a "guest" user entry in iax.conf (no secret 
specified), which goes to a limited context (possibly just 
Congestion)... Asterisk will always choose this no-secret-specified user 
entry first for any anonymous incoming IAX2 connections, without 
proposing any kind of secret match/challenge with the caller

I don't see a problem with having all these options. One, or a 
combination, should provide everything everyone needs.

I'm reviewing the current chan_iax2 code right now, and I'm going to 
write a new wiki page for "IAX2 Authentication" to document all this 
stuff more clearly so others don't have to figure it out the way I did :-)



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