[asterisk-users] unsolved: Re: solved: how to create a working certificate for using TLS?

Michael Maier m1278468 at mailbox.org
Sun Jul 7 04:55:47 CDT 2019

On 06.07.19 at 22:16 hwilmer wrote:
> Is there an advantage to using pjsip?  What's needed for easybell with pjsip?

For easybell, I don't know of any advantage. But that's not very reliable, because I'm using easybell for dedicated requirements only. I'm 
considering chan_sip legacy. I wouldn't build any new installation on chan_sip (if there are no technical contradictions).

Easybell does have a pretty fine documentation for FreePBX and pjsip:

[why encryption?]

> I consider it a requirement for when employees end up using their mobile phones over foreign wireless networks, which is something that would be 
> virtually impossible to prevent should the asterisk server be made reachable from the outside.

That's true. But don't forget to encrypt RTP at this point! This must be done additionally.
BTW: easybell doesn't support full RTP encryption. It's supported for outgoing calls only 

That's an example for an inbound call - there isn't any support for RTP encryption:

<--- Received SIP request (869 bytes) from TLS: --->
INVITE sip:+4912345678989 at;transport=TLS;line=xxxxxxx SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS;branch=z9hG4bKcu8ZTaf6c4iPU;rport
From: <sip:45678901234 at sip.easybell.de>;tag=2DC25244-5D21B65400044D02-6A194700
To: <sip:+4912345678989 at sip.easybell.de>
CSeq: 1891 INVITE
Call-ID: SBC4115e0000af5-5d21b654-67c091e3-a60cca0-924117e-01_b2b-1
Max-Forwards: 68
Supported: histinfo
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 286
Contact: <sip:5819011B-5D21B65400045FF0-F2350700 at;transport=tls>

o=- 1667528048 2824605765 IN IP4
c=IN IP4
t=0 0
m=audio 30934 RTP/AVP 9 8 0 101
a=rtpmap:9 G722/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-16

> And before that, why shouldn't phone calls always be encrypted for just in case?  They are always genuinely private, and it doesn't hurt anything.

True - no contradiction of mine.

>>> Setting 'tlscapath' to /etc/pki or to /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/ didn't seem to
>> I'm sorry - I don't know how to handle ca bundles with chan_sip. With pjsip it's
>> ca_list_file=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt >
>> in pjsip.transports.conf.
> Thanks, setting 'tlscafile=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt' seems to do the trick.  However:

Happy to here that it's working now.

> First I set 'tlsdontverifyserver=no' and issued a 'sip reload'.  There was no error message.  I found that suspicious and restarted asterisk, 
> and the error message came back.

There are some config changes which need a complete restart AFAIK (FreePBX explicitly warns about some changes requiring a restart).

> Only then I added 'tlscafile=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt' (which was unset before), and after a 'sip reload', the error message was gone.
> So far, it hasn't come back even when restarting asterisk.

That's how I'm handling it: After each change concerning the transport I'm restarting asterisk. Just to be sure. But that's a question which 
could be answered by Joshua much better.

> This shows that 'sip reload' doesn't really do a reload in that a certificate which hasn't been verified continues to be accepted after the 
> configuration changed to now require verifying the certificate.

The certificate check is done on starting the connection (SYN) by openssl. sip reload most probably doesn't restart the connection (because all 
running calls would be disconnected - that's most of the time not a good idea - sip reload usually doesn't destroy running sessions / calls).

> This might be a security problem, and if not, it is certainly good for surprises 
> and can create much confusion.

Just handle it like this: each transport relevant change requires a complete restart!

> Is it supposed to be like this, or should I make a bug report?

I think it's supposed to behave like this, because it would mean to disconnect all running calls on sip reload. That's probably not what most of 
the people expect / want to have.


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