[Asterisk-Dev] AES voice encryption for IAX2
Derek Smithies
derek at indranet.co.nz
Sun Apr 18 18:41:16 MST 2004
Hi,
> And how exactly is asterisk meant to know which user it should
> authenicating against? My model solves the problem of not using public
> key cryptography by exploiting the fact that both parties already have a
> secret.. the password. If you don't know the username, you won't know
> the password.
>
> Of course, we should be using public key crypto when possible, but we
> also need to cater for situations without.
>
My view is that we are talking about a protocol reorganisation, to get it
secure. Thus, the format of the authorisation packets will have to change.
It is possible to set up a secure link - you have read up on the different
security mechanisms out there. Transmitting username in the clear is a
nono. We just have to find a way to get it to happen.
Derek.
=====================================================================
On Mon, 19 Apr 2004, Adam Hart wrote:
> Derek Smithies wrote:
>
> >Adam,
> >
> >
> >
> >>I shutter at the thought but either way, it's a decision not to be made
> >>quite yet. Let's discuss other issues
> >>
> >>
> >I hate to think about it also, but, let us get used to it, and move on.
> >
> >
> Really Mark's call on that, I thought if we iron out some of the other
> issues, the answer will be clearer.
>
> >=============
> >Replay attacks are a real problem.
> >See, you listen in to one conversation.
> >Then, you use their initial packet to "connect with" and you are making
> >some progress toward either a)DOS attack or b)making a call.
> >
> >
>
> Random challenges solves the problem of replaying to make a successful
> call. Regarding DOS, I don't think you can prevent it - either method of
> auth requires CPU cycles. I'm open to suggestions though
>
> >Adam suggested:
> >
> >
> >>NEW (with username :|) ->
> >>AUTHREQ <- (with MD5 challenge and cipher challenge)
> >>AUTHREP -> (cipher challenge encrypted by AES using the result of the
> >>MD5 sum as the key)
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >I see no reason for transmitting the username in the clear.
> >If we are going to be secure, we are going to be secure. Consequently, we
> >cannot transmit username in the clear.
> >Further,
> > Sending New first, and then sending voice (before the authrep/authreq
> > exchange completes) is nonsensical, as the remote party cannot decode
> > our voice packets.
> >
> >We could do it as::
> > AUTHREQ <- (with MD5 challenge and cipher challenge)
> > AUTHREP -> (cipher challenge encrypted by AES using the result of the
> > MD5 sum as the key)
> > NEW (with username, and other setup parameters) ->
> >
> >yes, a change in protocol. Well, we better get used to it, cause a change
> >will be required to be secure.
> >
> >The other change will be that it will take something less than a second
> >(guess) to setup a secure relationship, before voice is sent.
> >This is quite different to current, where voice starts immediately.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> And how exactly is asterisk meant to know which user it should
> authenicating against? My model solves the problem of not using public
> key cryptography by exploiting the fact that both parties already have a
> secret.. the password. If you don't know the username, you won't know
> the password.
>
> Of course, we should be using public key crypto when possible, but we
> also need to cater for situations without.
>
> -Adam
>
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--
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